|T1585.001||Social Media Accounts|
Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct Phishing for Information or Phishing. Adversaries may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email account, such as through use of Social Media Accounts, to increase the chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: Domains).
To decrease the chance of physically tying back operations to themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email services.
APT1 has created email accounts for later use in social engineering, phishing, and when registering domains.
EXOTIC LILY has created e-mail accounts to spoof targeted organizations.
For FunnyDream, the threat actors likely established an identified email account to register a variety of domains that were used during the campaign.
HEXANE has established email accounts for use in domain registration including for ProtonMail addresses.
Kimsuky has created email accounts for phishing operations.
Lazarus Group has created new email accounts for spearphishing operations.
Leviathan has created new email accounts for targeting efforts.
Magic Hound has established email accounts using fake personas for spearphishing operations.
Mustang Panda has leveraged the legitimate email marketing service SMTP2Go for phishing campaigns.
|C0016||Operation Dust Storm||
For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors established email addresses to register domains for their operations.
During Operation Honeybee, attackers created email addresses to register for a free account for a control server used for the implants.
For Operation Wocao, the threat actors registered email accounts to use during the campaign.
Sandworm Team has created email accounts that mimic legitimate organizations for its spearphishing operations.
Silent Librarian has established e-mail accounts to receive e-mails forwarded from compromised accounts.
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.
Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Phishing).