Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography

ID Name
T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography
T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography

Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.


ID: T1573.001
Sub-technique of:  T1573
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Version: 1.0
Created: 16 March 2020
Last Modified: 26 March 2020

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description

3PARA RAT command and control commands are encrypted within the HTTP C2 channel using the DES algorithm in CBC mode with a key derived from the MD5 hash of the string HYF54&%9&jkMCXuiS. 3PARA RAT will use an 8-byte XOR key derived from the string HYF54&%9&jkMCXuiS if the DES decoding fails[1]

S0065 4H RAT

4H RAT obfuscates C2 communication using a 1-byte XOR with the key 0xBE.[1]


A variant of ADVSTORESHELL encrypts some C2 with 3DES.[2]

G0007 APT28

APT28 installed a Delphi backdoor that used a custom algorithm for C2 communications.[3]

G0064 APT33

APT33 has used AES for encryption of command and control traffic.[4]

S0438 Attor

Attor has encrypted data symmetrically using a randomly generated Blowfish (OFB) key which is encrypted with a public RSA key.[5]

S0344 Azorult

Azorult can encrypt C2 traffic using XOR.[6][7]


BADCALL encrypts C2 traffic using an XOR/ADD cipher.[8]


BADNEWS encrypts C2 data with a ROR by 3 and an XOR by 0x23.[9][10]

S0234 Bandook

Bandook has used AES encryption for C2 communication.[11]

S0534 Bazar

Bazar can send C2 communications with XOR encryption.[12]


BBSRAT uses a custom encryption algorithm on data sent back to the C2 server over HTTP.[13]

S0574 BendyBear

BendyBear communicates to a C2 server over port 443 using modified RC4 and XOR-encrypted chunks.[14]

S0268 Bisonal

Bisonal variants reported on in 2014 and 2015 used a simple XOR cipher for C2. Some Bisonal samples encrypt C2 communications with RC4.[15][16][17]


BLINDINGCAN has encrypted its C2 traffic with RC4.[18]

S0486 Bonadan

Bonadan can XOR-encrypt C2 communications.[19]


BRONZE BUTLER has used RC4 encryption (for Datper malware) and AES (for xxmm malware) to obfuscate HTTP traffic. BRONZE BUTLER has also used a tool called RarStar that encodes data with a custom XOR algorithm when posting it to a C2 server.[20]

S1039 Bumblebee

Bumblebee can encrypt C2 requests and responses with RC4[21]

S0077 CallMe

CallMe uses AES to encrypt C2 traffic.[22]

S0030 Carbanak

Carbanak encrypts the message body of HTTP traffic with RC2 (in CBC mode). Carbanak also uses XOR with random keys for its communications.[23][24]

S0348 Cardinal RAT

Cardinal RAT uses a secret key with a series of XOR and addition operations to encrypt C2 traffic.[25]

S0220 Chaos

Chaos provides a reverse shell connection on 8338/TCP, encrypted via AES.[26]

S0674 CharmPower

CharmPower can send additional modules over C2 encrypted with a simple substitution cipher.[27]

S0144 ChChes

ChChes can encrypt C2 traffic with AES or RC4.[28][29]


CHOPSTICK encrypts C2 communications with RC4.[30]

S0154 Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike has the ability to use AES-256 symmetric encryption in CBC mode with HMAC-SHA-256 to encrypt task commands and XOR to encrypt shell code and configuration data.[31]

S0244 Comnie

Comnie encrypts command and control communications with RC4.[32]


CORESHELL C2 messages are encrypted with custom stream ciphers using six-byte or eight-byte keys.[33]

S0050 CosmicDuke

CosmicDuke contains a custom version of the RC4 algorithm that includes a programming error.[34]

G0012 Darkhotel

Darkhotel has used AES-256 and 3DES for C2 communications.[35]

S0187 Daserf

Daserf uses RC4 encryption to obfuscate HTTP traffic.[20]

S0021 Derusbi

Derusbi obfuscates C2 traffic with variable 4-byte XOR keys.[36]

S0200 Dipsind

Dipsind encrypts C2 data with AES256 in ECB mode.[37]

S0472 down_new

down_new has the ability to AES encrypt C2 communications.[38]

S0134 Downdelph

Downdelph uses RC4 to encrypt C2 responses.[39]

S0384 Dridex

Dridex has encrypted traffic with RC4.[40]

S0038 Duqu

The Duqu command and control protocol's data stream can be encrypted with AES-CBC.[41]

S0377 Ebury

Ebury has encrypted C2 traffic using the client IP address, then encoded it as a hexadecimal string.[42]

S0081 Elise

Elise encrypts exfiltrated data with RC4.[43]

S0082 Emissary

The C2 server response to a beacon sent by a variant of Emissary contains a 36-character GUID value that is used as an encryption key for subsequent network communications. Some variants of Emissary use various XOR operations to encrypt C2 data.[44]

S0091 Epic

Epic encrypts commands from the C2 server using a hardcoded key.[45]

S0569 Explosive

Explosive has encrypted communications with the RC4 method.[46]

S0076 FakeM

The original variant of FakeM encrypts C2 traffic using a custom encryption cipher that uses an XOR key of "YHCRA" and bit rotation between each XOR operation. Some variants of FakeM use RC4 to encrypt C2 traffic.[22]


FALLCHILL encrypts C2 data with RC4 encryption.[47][48]

S0512 FatDuke

FatDuke can AES encrypt C2 communications.[49]

S0171 Felismus

Some Felismus samples use a custom encryption method for C2 traffic that utilizes AES and multiple keys.[50]

S0381 FlawedAmmyy

FlawedAmmyy has used SEAL encryption during the initial C2 handshake.[51]

S0661 FoggyWeb

FoggyWeb has used a dynamic XOR key and custom XOR methodology for C2 communications.[52]

C0001 Frankenstein

During Frankenstein, the threat actors communicated with C2 via an encrypted RC4 byte stream and AES-CBC.[53]

S0168 Gazer

Gazer uses custom encryption for C2 that uses 3DES.[54][55]

S0032 gh0st RAT

gh0st RAT uses RC4 and XOR to encrypt C2 traffic.[56]

S0342 GreyEnergy

GreyEnergy encrypts communications using AES256.[57]

S0632 GrimAgent

GrimAgent can use an AES key to encrypt C2 communications.[58]

S0132 H1N1

H1N1 encrypts C2 traffic using an RC4 key.[59]


Before being appended to image files, HAMMERTOSS commands are encrypted with a key composed of both a hard-coded value and a string contained on that day's tweet. To decrypt the commands, an investigator would need access to the intended malware sample, the day's tweet, and the image file containing the command.[60]

S0170 Helminth

Helminth encrypts data sent to its C2 server over HTTP with RC4.[61]

S0087 Hi-Zor

Hi-Zor encrypts C2 traffic with a double XOR using two distinct single-byte keys.[62]

S0394 HiddenWasp

HiddenWasp uses an RC4-like algorithm with an already computed PRGA generated key-stream for network communication.[63]

G0126 Higaisa

Higaisa used AES-128 to encrypt C2 traffic.[64]

S0009 Hikit

Hikit performs XOR encryption.[65]

S0431 HotCroissant

HotCroissant has compressed network communications and encrypted them with a custom stream cipher.[66][67]

S0068 httpclient

httpclient encrypts C2 content with XOR using a single byte, 0x12.[1]

S0203 Hydraq

Hydraq C2 traffic is encrypted using bitwise NOT and XOR operations.[68]

S0537 HyperStack

HyperStack has used RSA encryption for C2 communications.[69]

S1022 IceApple

The IceApple Result Retriever module can AES encrypt C2 responses.[70]

G0100 Inception

Inception has encrypted network communications with AES.[71]

S0260 InvisiMole

InvisiMole uses variations of a simple XOR encryption routine for C&C communications.[72]


KEYMARBLE uses a customized XOR algorithm to encrypt C2 communications.[73]

S0641 Kobalos

Kobalos's post-authentication communication channel uses a 32-byte-long password with RC4 for inbound and outbound traffic.[74][75]

S0162 Komplex

The Komplex C2 channel uses an 11-byte XOR algorithm to hide data.[76]


KONNI has used AES to encrypt C2 traffic.[77]

G0032 Lazarus Group

Several Lazarus Group malware families encrypt C2 traffic using custom code that uses XOR with an ADD operation and XOR with a SUB operation. Another Lazarus Group malware sample XORs C2 traffic. Other Lazarus Group malware uses Caracachs encryption to encrypt C2 payloads. Lazarus Group has also used AES to encrypt C2 traffic.[78][79][80][81][82]

S0395 LightNeuron

LightNeuron uses AES to encrypt C2 traffic.[83]

S0582 LookBack

LookBack uses a modified version of RC4 for data transfer.[84]

S0532 Lucifer

Lucifer can perform a decremental-xor encryption on the initial C2 request before sending it over the wire.[85]

S0010 Lurid

Lurid performs XOR encryption.[86]

S0409 Machete

Machete has used AES to exfiltrate documents.[87]

S0455 Metamorfo

Metamorfo has encrypted C2 commands with AES-256.[88]

S1026 Mongall

Mongall has the ability to RC4 encrypt C2 communications.[89]

S0149 MoonWind

MoonWind encrypts C2 traffic using RC4 with a static key.[90]

S0284 More_eggs

More_eggs has used an RC4-based encryption method for its C2 communications.[91]

S0256 Mosquito

Mosquito uses a custom encryption algorithm, which consists of XOR and a stream that is similar to the Blum Blum Shub algorithm.[92]

G0069 MuddyWater

MuddyWater has used AES to encrypt C2 responses.[93]

G0129 Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda has encrypted C2 communications with RC4.[94]

S0336 NanoCore

NanoCore uses DES to encrypt the C2 traffic.[95]

S0272 NDiskMonitor

NDiskMonitor uses AES to encrypt certain information sent over its C2 channel.[10]

S0630 Nebulae

Nebulae can use RC4 and XOR to encrypt C2 communications.[96]


NETEAGLE will decrypt resources it downloads with HTTP requests by using RC4 with the key "ScoutEagle."[97]


NETWIRE can use AES encryption for C2 data transferred.[98]

S0439 Okrum

Okrum uses AES to encrypt network traffic. The key can be hardcoded or negotiated with the C2 server in the registration phase. [99]

S0664 Pandora

Pandora has the ability to encrypt communications with D3DES.[100]

S1031 PingPull

PingPull can use AES, in cipher block chaining (CBC) mode padded with PKCS5, to encrypt C2 server communications.[101]

S0501 PipeMon

PipeMon communications are RC4 encrypted.[102]


PLAINTEE encodes C2 beacons using XOR.[103]


PLEAD has used RC4 encryption to download modules.[104]

S0013 PlugX

PlugX can use RC4 encryption in C2 communications.[105]

S0012 PoisonIvy

PoisonIvy uses the Camellia cipher to encrypt communications.[106]


POWERTON has used AES for encrypting C2 traffic.[4]

S0113 Prikormka

Prikormka encrypts some C2 traffic with the Blowfish cipher.[107]

S0650 QakBot

QakBot can RC4 encrypt strings in C2 communication.[108]

S0262 QuasarRAT

QuasarRAT uses AES with a hardcoded pre-shared key to encrypt network communication.[109][110][111]

S0629 RainyDay

RainyDay can use RC4 to encrypt C2 communications.[96]

S0495 RDAT

RDAT has used AES ciphertext to encode C2 communications.[112]

S0153 RedLeaves

RedLeaves has encrypted C2 traffic with RC4, previously using keys of 88888888 and babybear.[113]

S0433 Rifdoor

Rifdoor has encrypted command and control (C2) communications with a stream cipher.[66]


APT12 has used the RIPTIDE RAT, which communicates over HTTP with a payload encrypted with RC4.[114]

S0148 RTM

RTM encrypts C2 traffic with a custom RC4 variant.[115]

S0074 Sakula

Sakula encodes C2 traffic with single-byte XOR keys.[116]

S0053 SeaDuke

SeaDuke C2 traffic has been encrypted with RC4 and AES.[117][118]

S0610 SideTwist

SideTwist can encrypt C2 communications with a randomly generated key.[119]

S0633 Sliver

Sliver can use AES-GCM-256 to encrypt a session key for C2 message exchange.[120]


SMOKEDHAM has encrypted its C2 traffic with RC4.[121]


SNUGRIDE encrypts C2 traffic using AES with a static key.[122]

S0627 SodaMaster

SodaMaster can use RC4 to encrypt C2 communications.[123]

S0615 SombRAT

SombRAT has encrypted its C2 communications with AES.[124]

G0038 Stealth Falcon

Stealth Falcon malware encrypts C2 traffic using RC4 with a hard-coded key.[125]

S1034 StrifeWater

StrifeWater can encrypt C2 traffic using XOR with a hard coded key.[126]

S0603 Stuxnet

Stuxnet encodes the payload of system information sent to the command and control servers using a one byte 0xFF XOR key. Stuxnet also uses a 31-byte long static byte string to XOR data sent to command and control servers. The servers use a different static key to encrypt replies to the implant.[127]


SUNBURST encrypted C2 traffic using a single-byte-XOR cipher.[128]

S0060 Sys10

Sys10 uses an XOR 0x1 loop to encrypt its C2 domain.[129]

S0011 Taidoor

Taidoor uses RC4 to encrypt the message body of HTTP content.[130][131]


TAINTEDSCRIBE uses a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) algorithm for network encryption.[132]

S0678 Torisma

Torisma has encrypted its C2 communications using XOR and VEST-32.[133]

S0266 TrickBot

TrickBot uses a custom crypter leveraging Microsoft’s CryptoAPI to encrypt C2 traffic.[134]Newer versions of TrickBot have been known to use bcrypt to encrypt and digitally sign responses to their C2 server. [135]

S0436 TSCookie

TSCookie has encrypted network communications with RC4.[136]


Some versions of UPPERCUT have used the hard-coded string "this is the encrypt key" for Blowfish encryption when communicating with a C2. Later versions have hard-coded keys uniquely for each C2 address.[137]

S0180 Volgmer

Volgmer uses a simple XOR cipher to encrypt traffic and files.[138]

S0670 WarzoneRAT

WarzoneRAT can encrypt its C2 with RC4 with the password warzone160\x00.[139]

S0514 WellMess

WellMess can encrypt HTTP POST data using RC6 and a dynamically generated AES key encrypted with a hard coded RSA public key.[140][141][142]

S0430 Winnti for Linux

Winnti for Linux has used a custom TCP protocol with four-byte XOR for command and control (C2).[143]

S0141 Winnti for Windows

Winnti for Windows can XOR encrypt C2 traffic.[144]

S0653 xCaon

xCaon has encrypted data sent to the C2 server using a XOR key.[145]


XCSSET uses RC4 encryption over TCP to communicate with its C2 server.[146]

S0230 ZeroT

ZeroT has used RC4 to encrypt C2 traffic.[147][148]


ZIRCONIUM has used AES encrypted communications in C2.[149]


ID Mitigation Description
M1031 Network Intrusion Prevention

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level.


ID Data Source Data Component Detects
DS0029 Network Traffic Network Traffic Content

Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)).


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